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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 11, 1980 the Vienna Conference of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted the
"United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods" I (hereinafter referred to as the Vienna Convention, or
the Convention). The Vienna Convention applies to contracts between
parties of the member states involving the international sale of goods,
and thus supersedes domestic law. On January 1, 1988 the Convention
came into effect for the United States and ten other countries. 2 By
August 1, 1989, the Convention will enter into effect for six other
countries which ratified the Convention during 1988.1 The Vienna
Convention is already more successful than its predecessors; the 1964
Hague Conventions were ratified by only nine countries.
4
* Bonn, West Germany; LL.M. (University of Pennsylvania); Foreign Associate
at Cole, Corette & Abrutyn, Washington, D.C. The author wishes to thank Professor
John Honnold for his invaluable advice, the staff at the Biddle Law Library for
their support, and the Rotary Foundation for granting the scholarship. The article
will be published in a German version in 1988 OsTERREcImscIm ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG, ZfRV, 167-93 (Austrian Journal of Comparative Law).
UN Doc. A/Conf/97/18 Annex I (Apr. 10, 1980), GAOR, 33d Session, Supp.
35 (A/33/35) at 217; 52 Fed. Reg. 40, 6262-6280 (Mar. 2, 1987); reprinted in 18
I.L.M. 639-66 (1980) [hereinafter Convention, Vienna Convention, or 1980 Con-
vention].
2 Argentina, China, Egypt, France, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho, Syria, Yugoslavia
and Zambia. See UNCITRAL Doc. UN A CN.9/304/1988 at 4.
3 Austria, Finland, Mexico and Sweden (all Jan. 1, 1989); Australia (Apr. 1,
1989); Norway (Aug. 1, 1989). See UNCITRAL Doc., supra note 2, at 4 and ST-
LEG-Series E 6 and 7 U.N. Treaty Section. The most recent ratifications are those
by Denmark (Feb. 4, 1989) and German Democratic Republic (Feb. 22, 1989); for
these two countries the Convention will enter into force on March 1, 1990.
4 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169, [hereinafter 1964
Formation Convention] and Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter 1964 Sales
Convention].
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The commercial letter of confirmation has been widely known and
used in Central Europe for more than a century. Generally speaking,
a commercial letter of confirmation is a written repetition of contract
terms, or a summary of contract terms, sent by one party to another
about a contract which has already been concluded verbally or which
has not yet been concluded. 5 Confirmation letters are typically em-
ployed where the parties negotiate in different ways, for example,
when they exchange letters, negotiate on the telephone, send telexes
and fail to reduce their final agreement to writing. One party may
then issue a confirmation letter restating the agreement and, in some
cases, introducing new terms or its own standard terms. Generally,
the receiver's silence upon receipt of such a confirmation letter con-
stitutes acceptance of the terms stated in the letter.
In Europe, an impressive case law has been developed on com-
mercial letters of confirmation. This article will first compare the law
on confirmation letters in the Austrian, French, German and Swiss
legal systems .6 Austria and France-have already ratified the Conven-
tion; West Germany's ratification can be expected soon. 7 In its second
part, this article will discuss the relationship between the domestic
concepts of commercial letters of confirmation and the uniform law
under the 1980 Vienna Convention. With respect to the "new" Con-
vention, the question arises whether the "old" concept of commercial
letters of confirmation marks a gap in the uniform system or whether
this concept has been superseded by the Convention. This article does
not favor any solution requiring either a "gap" or "superseding"
interpretation. Rather, it proposes a framework for analyzing the
confirmation letter within the Convention itself, in short, the concept
of commercial letters of confirmation is applicable under the Con-
vention, provided a respective usage of trade can be established. The
framework for the application as usage of trade can be found in
Article 9 (1) and (2) of the Convention. In addition, Article 19(2)
of the Convention can be applied by analogy to the concept of
confirmation letter, regardless of whether the concept is known in
K. LARENZ, ALLGEMNEINER TEL DES BORGERICHEN RECHTS 663 (6th ed. 1983).
6 The concept of the confirmation letter is also known in Belgium, see generally
Ebenroth Das kaufmannische Bestatigungsschreiben im internationalen Handelsver-
kehr, 77 ZVgiRWiss 162, 175, 177, (1977); Denmark, see Beckmann in 0. SANDROCK,,
1 HANDBUCH DER INTERNATIONALEN VERTRAGSGESTALTUNG 323 (1980); Luxembourg,
see id. at 301; and the Netherlands, see id. at 309. On the other hand, Italy does
not recognize the concept, see id. at 309.
1 Bonn ratifiziert UN Kaufrecht Handelsblatt, Aug. 5-6, 1988, at 10 (Nr. 149).
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the countries where the parties are located. In this respect, even
though the concept of commercial letters of confirmation is not known
to American law, American merchants and lawyers would be well
advised to be aware of the concept.
II. COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CONFIRMATION IN GERMAN,
AUSTRIAN, Swiss AND FRENCH LAW
A. German Law
1. Introduction
Under German law, one party's silence in most situations signifies
neither acceptance nor refusal of an offer.8 In commercial transac-
tions, however, an important exception to this basic rule is that
silence after receiving a commercial letter of confirmation in many
circumstances will have legal effect as an acceptance. 9 This exception
is not codified either in the Civil Code (BGB) or in the Commercial
Code (HGB). 10 The final content of the parties' agreement is deter-
mined by the confirmation letter unless the receiving party objects
to it immediately."
In German law, two different types of situations can be distin-
guished in which confirmation letters are used. This distinction is
useful for the purposes of the discussion of the other three legal
systems, and the situations will be referred to as situation I and
situation II. In the first situation, the negotiations between the two
parties lead to an agreement, concluded orally or by telephone, telex
or cable. The letter of confirmation merely repeats and summarizes
the agreement.' 2 In this case, the letter serves as a clarification of
what the parties previously agreed upon (situation I). 13
8 BGHZ 1,353,355 (1951); D. MEDICUS, BORGERLICHEs RECHT § 52 (13th ed.
1987).
ROHG 1,76,81 (1870); RGZ 54,176,180/181 (1903); 95,48,50 (1919); BGHZ
11,1,3 (1953); see also text at note 46.
1o A different statutory exception exists in § 362 Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB], the
West German commercial code, see B. RUSTER, BusINEss TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY
(FRG) § 10.02(1)(1986). However, this section deals only with merchants conducting
business for others, e.g. brokers. Since the Convention is exclusively for "contracts
of sales of goods", Art. 1(1) CISG, § 362 HGB is not elaborated upon in this
paper.
1 K. SCHMIDT, HANDELSRECHT, 496-97 (3d ed. 1987); K. CAPELLE & C. CANAMS,
HANDELSRECHT 183 (20th ed. 1985).
12 MEDICUS, supra note 8, § 60.
13 W. FLUME, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BORGERLICHEN RECHTS 663 (3d ed. 1979);
K. Larenz, supra note 5, at 633.
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In the second type of situation, no final agreement has been reached,
but the parties regard the contract as almost concluded ("abschluss-
reif"); or the content of the oral agreement is not clear; or the
confirmation letter changes or contains additional clauses to the oral
agreement. In these situations, the confirmation letter establishes that
a contract was concluded and what its exact content is, unless the
receiver objects to it. 14 The receiver's silence is considered as accep-
tance of the letter. The not yet concluded agreement is thus concluded 5
and the contract has the content of the confirmation letter, even if
the letter differs from what was actually agreed upon orally (situation
11).16
A decision of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court) il-
lustrates the impact of the second situation.' 7 After the conclusion
of the contract, one party issued a commercial letter of confirmation.
In this letter, the sender only made reference to his own standard
terms which were not even included in the letter or known by the
receiver. These standard terms contained an arbitration clause ex-
cluding regular litigation. The receiver did not reply. Although the
terms were not part of the negotiations nor of the final oral agreement,
the court regarded the receiver's silence as an acceptance of the terms
in the letter and held the receiver bound to it. The court held that
the receiver was obliged to either object prophylactically to these
terms or ask for further explanation. Thus, under this decision, the
receiver must study carefully the terms and conditions stated in the
confirmation letter.
2. Prerequisites
In order to regard the receiver's silence as acceptance of the con-
firmation letter's terms, German jurisprudence requires that certain
conditions be fulfilled. They will be discussed briefly. 19
a. There have to be serious negotiations between the parties, leading
to an agreement or almost to an agreement. In most cases, these
,4 LARENZ, supra note 5, at 633; FLUME, supra note 13, at 663.
'5 BGHZ 7,187, 189 (1952); BGH in 23 NJW 2104 (1970).
16 BGHZ 7, 187, 189; A. BAUMBACH, K. DuDEN & K. HOPT, HANDELSOESTZBUCH
§ 346(3)(A)(b) (27th ed. 1987).
17 BGHZ 7, 189, 190 (1952); see also BGH in 23 NJW 2021 (1970); BGHZ
61,282,283 (1973).
is BGHZ 7, 187, 190-91.
19 For a more comprehensive discussion, see BAUMBACH, DUDEN & HOPT, supra
note 16, § 346(3)(C)(a-c) and SCHMIDT, supra note 11, at 510.
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negotiations are in oral form, by telephone, telex or cable, and there
exists no final draft of the contract. 20 The letter then refers to the
negotiations and restates the results as a final conclusion. 21
b. Since the doctrine is only applicable in commercial transactions,
the receiver of the letter must be a merchant. 22
The sender need not be a merchant; it is sufficient if he is involved
in transactions like a merchant. 23
c. To avoid being bound by the confirmation letter, the receiver
must object to it or reject it immediately.2 German courts are very
strict with respect to the amount of time the receiver has in which
to react. One week is always regarded as too late, and in one instance
even a three-day delay was sufficient to bind the receiver. 25
d. The sender of the letter has to act in good faith. This condition
is especially important in the situations where the agreement has not
yet been concluded or where the letter contains terms different from
the oral agreement (situation II).
The Bundesgerichtshof held in several cases that a confirmation
letter cannot change the content of the oral contract if it deviates
from the original agreement to such an extent that the sender could
not have reasonably expected the other party's approval. 26 The same
is true where the contract has not yet been concluded. The sender
must believe in good faith that the agreement has been concluded,
except for minor points. 27 The receiver's silence has no effect if the
negotiations did not reach the final stage ("noch nicht abschluss-
reif ').21 Accordingly, the requirement of good faith is used by the
courts to prevent the sender from changing the contract fundamentally
or deviating fundamentally from the negotiations. In almost every
- Oberlandesgericht Diisseldorf in 1982 Der Betrieb (DB) 592; MEDICUS, supra
note 8, § 60; BAUMBACH, DtUDEN & HOPT, supra note 16, at § 346(3)(C)(a).
21 BGH in 23 NJW 820, 820 (1972). There is, of course, no room for a confir-
mation letter in case the contract was concluded in written form.
22 Subject to certain conditions and exceptions, see BGHZ 11,1,3 (1953).
23 Id.; BGHZ 40,42,44 (1963).
24 The legal definition of "immediately" is contained in § 121 BGB: "... without
culpable delay (immediately) .... ." (Translation in I. FORRESTER, THE GERMAN
Cv-M CODE, 1975).
25 BGH in 15 NJW 246, 247 (1962); see BAUMBACH, DUDEN & HOPT, supra note
16, § 346(3)(C)(c).
26 BGHZ 40,42,45 (1963); BGHZ 61,282,286 (1973); BGH in 38 NJW 1333, 1333
(1985).
27 BGHZ 61,282,285 (1973); BAUMBACH, DUDEN & HOPT, supra note 16,
§ 346(3)(C)(a); CAPELLE & CANAlis, supra note 11, at 185.
28 SCHMDT, supra note 11, at 514.
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case, however, the sender was able to introduce clauses by referring
to his own standard terms such as an arbitration clause or a damage
waiver.
3. Legal Effect of the Confirmation Letters
a. Distinction From Other Commercial Instruments
The commercial letter of confirmation needs to be distinguished
from the other commercial instrument, the so- called order confir-
mation. The order confirmation, or "Auftragsbestatigung", is merely
an acceptance of an offer or, in case it does not conform with the
offer, a refusal combined with a new offer.29 The order confirmation
does not summarize any negotiations; rather, it is an offer or an
acceptance of an offer, labeled as a "confirmation". 30 In this case,
the sender knows that the contract has not yet been concluded and
the order confirmation letter should serve to reach an agreement.3'
However, it is difficult to draw a clear line of distinction between
a confirmation letter and an order confirmation.3 2 The distinction for
the receiver is nonetheless crucial: his subsequent silence to the order
confirmation does not constitute an acceptance but, rather, is a refusal
of the offer. 33
b. Concept of the Confirmation Letter
Under German jurisprudence, confirmation letters have different
legal consequences, "deklaratorische Bedeutung" in situation I and
"konstitutive Bedeutung" in situation II, which can be understood
as "evidentiary effect" and "decisive effect", respectively.3 4 A letter
that merely repeats an oral agreement (situation I) has only evidentiary
effect. The letter has no impact on the agreement, as it only functions
as evidence of the formation and the content of the contract. 35 As
29 § 150 II BGB; see ROSTER, supra note 10, § 10.02(1); BAUMBACH, DUDEN &
HOPT, supra note 16, § 346(3)(A)(a); SC-MIDT, supra note 11, at 508-09; c.f. Art.
19(1) CISG.
30 BGH in 27 NJW 991,992 (1974) citing BGHZ 18,212,215 (1955); SCHMIDT,
supra note 11, at 509.
31 BGHZ 61,282,285 (1973).
32 BGHZ 18,212,212 (1955); BGH in 27 NJW 991,992 (1974).
33 BGHZ 18,212,215 (1955); 61,282,285-86 (1973); RPSTER, supra note 10, § 10.02
(1).
1' See FLUME, supra note 13, at 663; SCHMiDT, supra note 11, at 518 (with a
different meaning of the two effects); Hefermehl in SCIEGELBERGER, HANDELSOE-
SETZBUCH, 5.A. 1976, § 346, 107.
35 BGHZ 61,282,285 (1973); FLUME, supra note 13, at 663.
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the Bundesgerichtshof expressly stated, the letter and the subsequent
silence do not form a new contract; rather, it is presumed ('"fingiert")
that a contract was formed having the content of the confirmation
letter.36 Thus, the confirmation letter restates and clarifies what the
parties have agreed upon. Consequently, any errors or ambiguities
that occurred during the negotiation process are eliminated. The
confirmation letter prevents future litigation about the contract itself.37
However, the court's presumption that the contract contains the
contents stated in the letter does not exclude the presentation of any
evidence to the contrary; the letter merely serves as a presumption
which can be rebutted. The silent receiver bears the legal and evi-
dentiary burden of showing that the letter is incorrect.
Where the parties have not reached a final agreement or where
the content of the letter is different from the oral contract (situation
II), the confirmation letter has decisive effect. The content of the
confirmation letter constitutes the contract and supersedes any prior
agreement.38 The effect in German contract law is that the letter and
the subsequent silence conclude or change the contract. The receiving
party can not be heard to argue that the contract had not yet been
concluded or had a different content.3 9 Since substantive law deter-
mines the burden of proof, the receiver has to show that he is not
bound by the terms in the letter. To avoid being bound, the receiver
can only allege and prove that the sender did not act in good faith
or that the letter deviated from the original agreement to an inper-
missable extent. 40 The receiver may also allege and prove that the
parties agreed on certain terms which are not covered by the con-
firmation letter and which are not inconsistent with the letter's terms.4 '
Thus, in German law there exist three different ways of forming
a contract: express offer and acceptance; performing an act indicating
acceptance and making similar declarations; 42 and finally, silence to
36 BGHZ 40,42,46 (1963); see also SCHMIDT, supra note 11, at 518.
37 LARmENZ, supra note 5, at 633.
38 RGZ 54,176,179 (1903); FLUME, supra note 13, at 663.
39 ScHMIDT, supra note 11, at 520; von Caemmerer, Die Ergebnisse der Konferenz
hinsichtlich der Vereinheitlichung der Rechts des Abschlusses von Kaufvertragen, 29
RAELsZ 101, 125 (1965).
BGHZ 61,282,285 1973); SCHMIDT, supra note 11, at 520.
41 BGH in 1986 BETRIEBSBERATER (BB) 225,226.
42 E.g. signing a contract at the same time or by performing an act indicating
the acceptance (konkludentes Handeln). This can be compared to Art. 18 1,111 CISG;
R. HERBER, DAS WIN R UNCITRAL UBEREINKOMMEN 17 (1983).
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a confirmation letter. 43 In commerce, the confirmation letter doctrine
clearly serves to obviate a time-consuming drafting process. In contrast
to an exchange of several documents, the issuance of one letter is
sufficient to form a contract, thus saving time and costs for merchants.
There is, however, criticism of this extensive application of the
decisive effect of confirmation letters. The decisive effect is open to
misuse by a sender who introduces standard terms favorable for
himself after the contract is concluded." Therefore, some commen-
tators posit that parties should not have the power by confirmation
letters either to conclude or to change an agreement. These com-
mentators suggest that confirmation letters be given only evidentiary
effect.45 In practical terms, the letter's effect is in any event important
if produced as evidence. Whether the letter merely repeats the already-
concluded contract, or itself concludes or modifies a contract, it can
be and is produced as evidence of contractual terms in courts.
c. Source of the concept: Usage of trade or rule of law?
There is disagreement over whether the doctrine of confirmation
letters results from usage of trade or is instead a substantive rule of
law. 46 To avoid confusion over terminology, usage of trade, for
purposes of this article, has legal effect only when it is established
as a question of fact in the individual case. 47 The usage might be
different, depending upon the particular trade concerned. In contrast,
a rule of law applies without regard to the current practices proven
for the particular case.
The Bundesoberhandelsgericht and its successor, the Reichsober-
handelsgericht,4 based the concept of the confirmation letter on usage
43 U. Huber, Der UNCITRAL Entwurf eines Obereinkommens fiber internationale
Warenkaufvertage 43 RABELsZ 413, 449 (1979).
- SCHMT, supra note 11, at 507; CAPELLE & CANARIS, supra note 11, at 182;
K. Batsch, Abschied vom sogenannten kaufmannischen Bestatigungsschreiben?, 33
NJW 1731, (1980), would restrict the decisive effect, especially with regard to a
modification of the contract through an extensive interpretation and application of
§ 4 AGBG (Standard Terms Act).
41 Kramer in Minchner Kommentar zum Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol. I, All-
gemeiner Teil, (2d. ed. 1984), § 151, 20; A. Oflwald, Der sogenannte Vertragsschlufl
durch kaufmannisches Bestatigungsschreiben, Diss. Bonn 1972, S.271 ff.
4' See Huber, supra note 43, at 448; FLUME, supra note 13, at 666; SCHmEDT,
supra note 11, at 497 (questioning the distinction between usage of trade and
customary law).
47 Junge in H. D6LLE, KOPMENTAR ZuM EI-MrICHEN KAUFRECHT 1976, Art.
9, 23 describing that this approach is adopted in almost every major legal system.
' The Bundesoberhandelsgericht (BOHG) was founded in June 12, 1869 and
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of trade. 49 The Reichsoberhandelsgericht readily developed the concept
as a matter of case law.5 0 Its successor, the Reichsgericht, referred
to the usage of trade under Section 346 of the Commercial Code
and to the decisions of the Reichsoberhandelsgericht.5' Under the
Reichsgericht case law, silence upon receiving a confirmation letter
had legal effect.52 The Bundesgerichtshof refers only to the "principle
developed by jurisprudence and scholars" 53 as the basis for stating
the rule that silence upon a confirmation letter constitutes acceptance.
The concept today is a rule of law which was developed by the
jurisprudence of the courts.54 The concept no longer depends in each
case on proof of actual usage. Rather it is a rule of substantive law
("objektives Recht") that binds the silent receiver of a confirmation
letter to its terms. 55
B. Austrian Law
In Austria, too, neither the Civil Code (AGBG) nor the Commercial
Code (HGB) codified the effect of silence after receiving a confir-
mation letter. For a long time, the Austrian jurisprudence followed
the German doctrine of the confirmation letter.
In commercial matters, Austrian courts regarded the receiver's
silence to a confirmation letter as an acceptance in cases where no
agreement had been reached or where the letter modified the con-
tract.5 6 Austrian law accepted - to use the German category - the
located in Leipzig. It had jurisdiction for, inter alia, commercial transactions under
the 1862 Commercial Code (ADHgB). In 1871, after the foundation of the Deutsches
Reich, the BOHG was renamed Reichsoberhandelsgericht (ROHG). The ROHG itself
was dissolved in 1879 into the Reichsgericht (RG). See generally 1 ERLER, 2 HAND-
W6RTERBUCH ZUR DEUTSCHEN RECHTSGESCICHTIE 536, 537 (1971); id. at 714, 715
(1986).
49 ROHG 1,76,80 et seq. (1870).
50 ROHG 1,76,81 (1870); 15,94,96 (1874); see RGZ 54,176,180 (1903) with ref-
erence to holdings of ROHG 15,94,97; 16,41 et seq.; 22,130 et seq.
,- RGZ 54,176,180 (1903); § 346 HGB: "Among merchants, due consideration
shall be given to prevailing customs and usages concerning the significance and effect
of actions and omissions." (Translation in Riister, supra note 10, App. 2-72)
52 RGZ 95,46,51 (1919); 103,401,405 (1922); see also SCHMIDT, supra note 11, at
497.
53 BGHZ 40,42,45 (1963).
1' SCHMIDT, supra note 11, at 497; Hefermehl, supra note 34, § 346, para. 107;
FLUME, supra note 13, at 665-66.
" SCHMIDT, supra note 11, at 497.
16 Rummel in P. RUMMEL, KoMMENTAR zuM ABGB § 861, para. 13 (1983);
§ 861,13; B. Pfister, Rechtswirkungen des kaufmannischen Bestiatigungsschreibens
nach osterreichischem Recht, 1977 RIW 530, 531.
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decisive effect of the confirmation letter.17 In 1970, the Oberste
Gerichtshof, the highest civil court, bound the receiver to-the contents
of a confirmation letter modifying the earlier agreement because the
receiver had not objected to the letter. The court held that the letter
had decisive effect ("rechtserzeugende Wirkung' ")s8 and therefore su-
perseded any oral agreement.5 9 This decision was in line with the
court's holdings over sixty years.60
In 1974, however, the Oberste Gerichtshof bowed to criticism of
the Austrian doctrine and overruled its traditional jurisprudence. 6' In
this case, the sender tried to introduce a clause after the contract
had been concluded orally. The clause, which was not discussed during
the negotiations, imposed a penalty on the receiver in the event he
was in delay. The court held that the parties' oral agreement, and
not the confirmation letter issued unilaterally by one party, constitued
the contract. The court expressly declined to give any decisive effect
to the confirmation letter. It held that if the confirmation letter
differs from the oral agreement and itself concludes the contract or
by adding a clause to the contract, then the receiver's silence is not
regarded as acceptance and he is not bound by the contents of the
letter. 62 In light of this landmark 1974 decision, Austrian law differs
in this significant respect from German law. The court left unresolved
the question of whether the confirmation letter has any effect if it
is not contradictory to the oral agreement.
In 1977, the court reaffirmed its 1974 decision. In this 1977 case
a buyer tried to include a clause enabling him to reduce the price
by a certain amount for each day the seller delayed. The court refused
57 F. Bydlinski, Das allgemeine Vertragsrecht in DAs UNCITRAL KAUFRECHT nm
VERGLEICH ZUM OSTERREICHISCHEN RECHT: SYmPosIUM IN BADEN BEI WIEN 1983, 57,
82 (P. Doralt ed. 1985) [hereinafter BADEN-SYmpOSItm].
11 This is the Austrian equivalent of the "konstitutive Bedeutung" or decisive
effect.
90GH in 92 JBL 478,479 (1970)
60 H. Haimmerle, Kaufmannische Bestiatigungsschreiben in REFORMEN DES RECHTS,
FESTSCHR= DER UNIVERSITrXT GRAz, 291-99, at 294-96 (1979), listing the court's
decisions; Pfister, supra note 56, at 531.
61 OGH in 97 JBL 89,90 (1975),(citing F. BYDLINSKI, PRIVATAUTONOMIE UND
OBJEKTIVE GRUNDLAGEN DES VERPFLICHTENDEN RECHTSOESCHAFmS 167 et seq. (1967)
[hereinafter PRIVATAUTONOMEI; F. Bydlinski, Anmerkung zum Urteil OGH in 92
JBL 478(1970), 92 JBL 478 (1970); and Wahle in H. Kang, Kommentar zum
Allgemeinen Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol. IV 2 (2d ed. 1978) (Lfg. 1965) at 39 et
seq.).
62 OGH in 97 JBL 89,91 (1975). The situations the court pointed out are those
described in situation II.
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to regard this clause as a part of the contract even though the seller
did not object to it.63
Although the court might have reached the same result under the
traditional rule, 64 the court repeated its 1974 statement that the security
and efficacy of commercial transactions require that an oral agreement
cannot be modified by a confirmation letter that is the act of only
one party. 65 The Austrian commentators accepted the new jurispru-
dence and adopted the shift. 6 A letter of confirmation followed by
the receiver's silence no longer has decisive effect. 67 Questions about
whether the sender acts in good faith or whether the modification is
of major or minor importance are no longer determinative. The crucial
inquiry is whether the modification is contradictory to the oral agree-
ment. 68 As an additional consequence, the confirmation letter no
longer has the effect of concluding a contract. 69
The Oberste Gerichtshof has not answered the question of whether
the confirmation letter followed by silence has any effect when it is
not contradictory to the agreement. It has been suggested that in this
situation the silence should be treated as an acceptance. 70 Some com-
mentators have attempted to limit the application of this exception
to only those cases where the letter interprets contractual conditions.
The parties must have discussed the conditions and must have either
left the interpretation open or left it to the discretion of one party.
In this exceptional case, the receiver's obligation to respond derives
from usage of trade (Section 346 HGB), and in case of his silence
he is bound to the interpretation in the letter. 71
63 OGH in 99 JBL 593,594 (1977).
64 Ebenroth, supra note 6, at 163; Beckmann, supra note 6, at 327.
61 OGH in 99 JBL 593,594 (1977).
66 Bydlinski, Die Entmythologisierung des "kaufmannischen Bestiitigungsschrei-
bens" im 6sterreichischen Recht in FESTSCHRIFT FOR WERNER FLUME ZuM 70 GE-
BURTSTAG (H-H Jakobs ed. 1978) 335-57, at 340 et seq.; Baden-Symposium, supra
note 57, at 82; Hdimmerle, supra note 60, at 298; Rummel in RUMMEL, supra note
56, § 861, para. 13; H. H RMLE & H. WONSCH, HANDELSRECHT, vol. 3, (3d ed.
1979), at 35 et seq.; H. KoZIOL & R. WELSER, GRUNDRISS DES BORGERLICHEN RECHTS
vol. 1, 83 (7th ed. 1985).
67 HAMMERLE & WONSCH, supra note 66, at 36; PRIVATAUTONOMIE, supra note
61, at 202.
68 OGH in 97 JBL 89, 91 (1975); HAmmerle, supra note 60, at 299; PRIVATAU-
TONOMIE, supra note 61, at 202.
69 PRIVATAUTONOMIE, supra note 61, at 202.
70 PRIVATAUTONOMIE, supra note 61, at 203; Wahle, supra note 61, at 42; HAM-
MERLE & WONSCH, supra note 66, at 36.
71 PRIVATAUTONOMIE, supra note 61, at 207.
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Only the decisive effect has been eliminated in Austrian law. The
confirmation letter still has evidentiary character: an orally concluded
contract can be restated in the confirmation letter. The letter then
serves as evidence of the content of the contract, without excluding
the right to produce evidence to the contrary. 72
C. Swiss Law
Due to the strong influence of German jurisprudence, Swiss law
treats similarly to German law a person's silence upon receipt of a
confirmation letter. 7 The Swiss recognition of the letter's effect is
based upon an analogy with Article 6 OR74 or on Article 6 OR in
conjunction with the principle of good faith. 75
However, there are differences between German and Swiss law
which can be demonstrated through the two situations identified
above. Swiss law accepts the evidentiary effect when a confirmation
letter only repeats the oral agreement (situation I).76 The subsequent
silence has no legal effect since the letter serves only as evidence of
the sender's opinion of what the parties agreed upon. 77 The receiver,
in order to avoid being bound to the letter's terms, may present
contrary evidence showing that the letter does not correctly restate
the oral contract.7 8
In 1945, the Schweizerische Bundesgericht, the highest civil court,
considered the situation in which a confirmation letter varied from
the oral agreement. 79 The court held that in this situation the con-
72 Bydlinski, BADEN-SYMPOSIUM, supra note 57, at 82; Ha.mmerle, supra note 60,
at 298.
71 Picard Freres v. Hofmehl, BGE 30 II 298 (1904) referring to ROHG 1,76
(1871); Habegger v. Kuhn, BGE 71 11 223,223 (1945); Ebenroth, supra note 6, at
177; Beckmann, supra note 6, at 325.
74 See Hartley & Martin Etablissement v. Eschler, BGE 100 II 18,22 (1974); 1
P. VON TuHR, ALLGEM:EINER TEn. DES SCHWEIZERISCF[EN OBLIGATIONENRECHTS, 189
(3d ed. 1980); Art.6 OR: "Where, due to the particular nature of the transaction,
or due to the circumstances, express acceptance is not to be expected, the contract
is deemed to be concluded if the offer is not declined within reasonable time."
(translation in Swiss - American Chamber of Commerce, Swiss Contract Law, 1977).
71 T. GuH, H. MERZ & M. KUMMER, DAS SCHWEIZERISC-E OBLIGATIONENRECHT
98 (1980).
76 Guinand, L 'offre et l'acceptation, in Premieres journes juridiques yougoslavo
- suisses, 197-207 at 204/205 (1984); E. BUCHER, SCHWEIZERISCHES OBLIGATIONEN-
RECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEL oI- DELIKTSRECHT 122 (1979).
" Guinand, supra note 76, at 205.
78 GUmH, MERz & KUMMR, supra note 75, at 98; BUCHER, supra note 76, at
122.
79Habegger, BGE 71 II 223,223 (1945). Compare situation II.
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firmation letter has not only evidentiary but also decisive effect. The
court regarded the letter as an offer and the subsequent silence as
the acceptance.80 As in German law, the sender must act in good
faith. If he changes the contract knowingly, or knowingly states an
agreement which was not concluded, then he is not acting in good
faith and the receiver's silence has no effect .8
Although the Habegger decision has not been overruled, Swiss
commentators are very critical of giving decisive effect to the reci-
pient's silence when the confirmation letter changes an oral contract.
This criticism is based on an obiter dictum of the Bundesgericht itself
in Hartley & Martin Etablissement.2 In this case, the Bundesgericht
addressed the issue of whether a confirmation letter could conclude
by "confirmation" a contract which had not yet been concluded.
The court held that the letter did not have this effect because in this
particular situation the usage of trade required a written contract. 83
However, the court said in obiter dictum that even in commercial
transactions it doubted that the receiver's silence could be regarded
as acceptance where only negotiations had taken place.84
The Swiss commentators base their criticism of decisive effect on
Article 6 OR, which has to be interpreted in the light of the principle
of good faith.85 Thus, it is argued, any clause or condition introduced
for the first time in the confirmation letter is not part of the contract,
and the letter does not conclude the contract even if the receiver does
not object.86 The silence only shows the receiver's opinion that the
confirmation letter reflects the concluded contract correctly. Hence,
he is bound to the terms of the letter and bears the burden to disprove
them .87
Thus, recent commentaries would abolish any decisive effect; a
confirmation letter and subsequent silence should not change a prior
so Id.
1, Id.; GuH., MERZ & KUMMER, supra note 75, at 98; H. OTTO, ALLGEMEINE
GESCHXFTSBEDINGUNGEN UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 8 (1984); Guinand,
supra note 76, at 205.
82 Gum, MEviz & KUMMER, supra note 75, at 98; Guinand, supra note 76, at
206; Stoffel, Formation du contract in THE 1980 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, LAUSANNE COLLOQUIUM OF 1984, 55, 67, 68 (1985);
see also, Bydlinski, BADEN SYMPosIUM, supra note 57, in n.76.
83 Hartley & Martin Etablissement, BGE 100 11 18,22/23 (1974).
, Id.; see Ebenroth, supra note 6, at 179; Guinand, supra note 76, at 205.
" GuHL, MERZ & KUMMER, supra note 75, at 98.
86 Id.; Stoffel, supra note 82, at 68.
17 GuHL, MERZ & KUMMER, supra note 75, at 98.
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agreement .8  This strong opposition to Habegger, and the obiter
dictum in Hartley & Martin Etablissement indicate that Habegger
will probably be overruled in the future.
D. French Law 9
Under French law an acceptance cannot, as a general rule, be based
on the party's silence following an offer. 90 In 1870, the Cour de
Cassation, the highest civil court, held that mere silence is not suf-
ficient to bind a party; that silence can be regarded as an acceptance
only if certain circumstances are fulfilled.9' It is often held, under
this so called silence circonstanci theory92 that silence equals accep-
tance in commercial transactions. 93
Although French law does not recognize a specific doctrine of
commercial letters of confirmation, one party's failure to respond to
a letter of another party is treated under the silence circonstanci6
theory. The silence constitutes acceptance of the terms contained in
the letter because the receiver has an obligation to respond to a
confirmation letter ("lettre de confirmation ).94 The obligation derives
from usage between the parties or usage of trade ("coutume com-
merciale ").91
However, French Courts draw a distinction between letters which
only interpret an already-concluded contract ("lettre interpretative")
I d.; Stoffel, supra note 82, at 68; Guinand, supra note 76, at 206.
89 The law in Belgium and Luxembourg is identical to French law with respect
to confirmation letters. See Beckmann, supra note 6, at 299, 301.
"0 Breton in ENCYCLOPEDIE DA.LOZ, DROIT cIviL FRANCAIS, "consentement" no.39;
B. STARK, H. ROLAND & L. BOYER, DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS 2, CONTRACT ET QUASI
- CONTRACT, (2d ed. 1986) § 136; H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD & M. JUGLART, LECONS
DE DROIT CIVIL, vol. 11-1, LES OBLIGATIONS (5th ed. 1973) § 137.
11 Cass. civ., 25.5.1870, Dalloz 18 70,1,p. 2 57 : ". . . le silence de celui qu'on pretend
oblige, ne peut suffire en l'absence de toute autre circonstance pour faire preuve
contre lui de l'obligation allgue."; see also Barfuss, Die Einbeziehung Allgemeiner
Geschdftsbedingungen in den Vertrag nach franzosischem Recht, 1975 RIW/AWD
319-328, at 322.
92 Breton, supra note 90, at no. 40; 1 M. FEmD, DA FRANzOsicHE ZIVILRECHT
261, 272 (1971); Ebenroth, supra note 6, at 173; H. SONNENBERGER, FRANz6siSCIHES
HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 12 (1975).
93 Breton, supra note 90, at no. 43; SCHMIDT & Niggemann, Die Vereinbarung
von Allgemeinen Geschdftsbedingungen duch stillschweigende Vereinbarung nach
franz6sischem Recht, 1974 RIW/AWD 309, at 310.
94 Breton, supra note 90, at no. 44; STARK, ROLAND & BOYER, supra note 90,
§ 143; OTTO, supra note 81, at 29; Beckmann, supra note 6, at 298.
91 E.g. Cass. com. 9.1.1956, 1956 Bull. Civ. III no.17, p.14; STARCK, ROLAND,
BOYER, supra note 90, § 143; Beckmann, supra note 6, at 298; Barfuss, supra note
91, at 323.
[Vol. 18:427
COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CONFIRMATION
and those which make an important modification to a contract ("lettre
modificative").96 What constitues a modification importante is not
generally defined, but is determined case by case. The legal effect of
the distinction is quite important: only silence upon receiving a lettre
interpretative constitutes acceptance. An important modification can-
not be achieved by a confirmation letter. 97
The French case law on the subject demonstrates that there is no
consistent doctrine in French law. In 1961, the Cour de Cassation
held that an arbitration clause was binding for the silent party,
although it was introduced for the first time in a confirmation letter
after the contract was concluded, and was not a product of the
negotiation process. 9 Likewise, in 1966 a party was held bound to
standard terms which were introduced by the sender of a letter after
the contract was concluded. 99 In the same line is a decision of the
Cour d'Appel de Paris which bound the silent party to an arbitration
clause included in the seller's bill. 100
On the other hand, the Cour de Cassation held in 1972 that the
receiver's silence after receiving a letter which introduced a jurisdiction
clause does not modify the agreement. 0 1 In contrast to the decisions
in 1962 and 1966, the court regarded the clause as an important
modification so that the silence did not have any legal effect. Similarly,
in 1973 the court found a party not bound by a jurisdiction clause
that was introduced after the contract was concluded. 0 2 Although
the parties were not involved in commercial transactions, the com-
mentators extended the holding to commercial papers and argued
that the holding would prevent any attempts to bind the other party
to a jurisdiction clause which had been introduced after the conclusion
of the contract. 10 These cases, which are more restrictive than those
96 OTTO, supra note 81, at 30; Beckmann, supra note 6, at 298.
97 OTTO, supra note 81, at 30; Beckmann, supra note 6, at 298.98 Cass. com., 17.10.1961, Recueil Dalloz Sirey 1962 p.106; it is interesting to
note that the court was concerned with the same facts as the German Bundesger-
ichtshof in 1952 (BGHZ 7,187 (1952)). In both cases, the courts held the receiver
bound to the clauses in the letter.
Cass. Com., 6.6.1966, 1966 Bull. Civ. II no. 737 p. 519, 520; Breton, supra
note 90, at no. 44.
100 Cour d'Appel de Paris, 14.1.75, holding in: 1976 RIW/AWD 304.
10l This clause was a "clause d'attributive de jurisdiction au tribunal de commerce."
Cass. com., 7.2.1972, 1972 Bull. Civ. IV no. 48, p.47 et seq; see also Rouen,
1.4.1971, Recueil Dalloz Sirey 1971, Somm. p. 126.
102 Cass. Civ., 5.12.1973, Recueil Dalloz 1974, p.398, 399.
103 H. Solus & R. Perrot in Recueil Dalloz 1974, p.399, 400.
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from 1962 and 1966, are cited by commentators to demonstrate the
negative attitude of the French courts to regarding silence to a con-
firmation letter as an acceptance.1°4
Thus, within the limitation of the important modification, French
law recognizes the decisive effect of confirmation letters. However,
there is disagreement between the courts about whether some types
of clauses fall into one category or the other. While some courts
regarded arbitration and jurisdiction clauses as an important modi-
fication, other courts did not.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND
THE COMMERCIAL LETTER OF CONFIRMATION
So far, the concept of the commercial letter of confirmation has
been elaborated without drawing any distinction between national
and international transactions. But, of course, merchants use con-
firmation letters in international trade, too.
Under the Vienna Convention, the question arises whether the
respective domestic law applicable to a contract governs the effect
of silence upon a confirmation letter or whether the Convention itself
is solely applicable. To answer this question, it is necessary to explore
the Convention and its relationship to domestic concepts of the
confirmation letter.
The Convention itself contains guidelines for its interpretation.
According to Article 7(1) CISG, three considerations must guide the
interpretation of the Convention: (1) the Convention's international
character; (2) the need to promote uniformity in its application; and
(3) the observance of good faith in international trade. The courts
are directed by Article 7(1) CISG to settle any question "in conformity
with the general principles" on which the Convention is based. This
article examines the relationship between the Convention, as an in-
ternational treaty, and domestic law. Therefore, the analysis is also
governed by customary international law as it is now codified in the
Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties of May 1969.105
'0' SONNENBERGER, supra note 93, at 12; Mezger, Gerichtsstands- und andere
Klauseln im Geschaftsverkehr mit Frankreich, 1974 RIW/AWD 377, at 378 n.12.
10, The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties of 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980. See J. HONNOLD, UNiFORM LAW FOR INTER-
NATIONAL SALES § 103 (1982), as to the relationship between the 1969 Treaty Con-
vention and Art. 7 CISG. See A. VERDROSS & B. SnMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT
§ 775 (1985), as to the relationship between customary international law and the
Vienna Treaty Convention.
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A. Wording of the Sales Convention
Part II of the Convention deals with the formation of contracts.
Article 18 (1) CISG, which deals with the effect of silence, expressly
provides that "silence or inactivity does not in itself amount to
acceptance." Although Articles 18 (3) and 19 CISG constitute ex-
ceptions to this general rule, the commercial confirmation letter is
not addressed in either of these Articles.
Unlike the preparatory work'06 to the 1964 Sales and Formation
Conventions 10 7, the traveaux prbparatoires to the Vienna Convention
address the confirmation letter only briefly.10 8 The issue was mentioned
in the context of Article 7(2) - former Article 6 of the 1978 Draft
Convention - and served only as an example. The Italian representative
used it as a demonstration of a 'gap' in the Convention where domestic
law applies. In his view, the applicable domestic law would be the
law of the seller's place of business.1 9 The argument could therefore
be made that the Vienna Conference agreed that in the case a failure
to reply to a confirmation letter, domestic law should govern the
formation of the contract rather than the regime of the Convention.
However, since this interpretation is not clear, a positive conclusion
cannot be drawn. Thus, under the general rule stated in Article 18
(1) CISG, silence upon a confirmation letter has no effect.
B. The Controversy
The Convention neither expressly regulates silence upon receiving
a letter of confirmation nor excludes it from its regulatory scheme.
Since 1978, there has been a widespread controversy about whether
or not the confirmation letter is covered by the context of the Con-
vention.110
1. Ulrich Huber's approach
Huber,"' in examining the 1978 Draft Convention, concentrated
on the question of whether the rules in the Convention on the
106 For the relevance of the traveauxprtaratoires ee Art. 32 of the Vienna Treaties
Convention, and VERDROSS & SImA, supra note 105 at § 779.
10, Schlechtriem in D6LLE, supra note 47, Art. 6 EAG, 36; von Caemmerer, supra
note 39, at 125 et seq.
101 A/Conf.97/C.I/SR.5 sub.18(=O.R.p.256)
109 Id.
110 See Arts. 31 (1), (2) of the Vienna Law of the Treaties Convention on the
importance of the context of an international treaty.
"I Professor of Law, University of Bonn, West Germany.
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formation of contracts are comprehensive or whether gaps exist re-
quiring the application of domestic law. If the Convention is com-
prehensive, then it alone should govern the effect of a failure to
respond to a confirmation letter. A gap in application must be bridged
by applicable domestic law. 1 2
Huber denies that the confirmation letter is an offer under Article
14 CISG, and he does not regard the letter as a usage of trade. He
assumes the existing German concept"' of forming a contract through
silence upon a confirmation letter to be a rule of law which might
be superseded by the Convention." 4
However, Huber denies the exclusive applicability of the Conven-
tion's rules. As support for the nonexclusivity of the Convention,
Huber compares the methods of contract formation under the Con-
vention with corresponding rules in German law. German law rec-
ognizes three different forms of concluding a contract." 5 The
Convention, however, regulates only formation of a contract through
offer and acceptance (Article 23 CISG). Huber concludes that the
formation rules of the Convention are not comprehensive. In addition,
a unification of law with respect to contract formation through silence
upon receipt of a confirmation letter was not chosen. Therefore,
neither should some countries abolish the concept nor should others
be forced to adopt it.116
Huber suggests that this existing gap in the Convention should be
bridged by domestic law and not by uniform rules. The applicable
domestic law should be the silent party's law. This approach would
be fair and, in addition, favor the foreign party." 7
2. Peter Schlechtriem's Approach
Schlechtrieml" regards Huber's solution as a fragmentation of the
law governing contract formation, which fragmentation is prohibited
112 Huber, supra note 43, at 447.
113 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
"" Id. at 448; see HERBER, supra note 42, at 18.
"I See supra note 36.
116 Huber, supra note 43, at 449; see also Dilger, Das Zustandekommen von
Kaufvertragen im Aussenhandel nach internationalem Einheitsrecht und nationalem
Sonderrecht, 45 RABELSZ 169, 181 (1981).
'7 Huber, supra note 43, at 449; Dilger, supra note 116, at 181; on the question
of the applicable law in the case of confirmation letters, (the law of the silent party)
see BGH in IPR Rspr. 1970 Nr. 133; BGHZ 57,72,77 (1971); Luideritz in H. SOERGEL
& W. SIEBERT, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, EINFtHRUNGSGESETZ Art. 7, no. 280
(11th ed. 1984); Beckmann supra note 6, at 269, 270.
"I Professor of Law, University of Freiburg, West Germany.
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by the unification purpose of Article 7(1) CISG. 1" 9 According to
Schlechtriem, the entire process of contract formation is governed
by the Convention. He bases his solution on whether and to what
extent the confirmation letter has effect under Article 9(2).120 He
compares Article 9 CISG with the 1964 Convention on the Formation
of the Contracts (ULF) under which the German concept of the
confirmation letter has effect as usage of trade in the sense of Articles
2,6,13 ULF.' 2 1 Unlike Article 2 ULF, the Convention limits the effect
of the confirmation letter in Article 9(2) CISG' 22 to situations where
".. . the relevant business customs exist between the parties of that
particular branch of trade..."-*.123 Thus, Schlechtriem would give
effect to the receiver's silence only within the the limits of Article
9(2) CISG, an approach accepted by many commentators.' 24
3. Franz Bydlinski's and W.A. Stoffel's approach
In contrast to Huber, Bydlinski 25 and Stoffel 26 regard the Con-
vention's rules on the formation of the contract (part II) as exhaustive,
with the result that the conclusion of the contract is limited to offer
and acceptance as Article 23 CISG provides. 27
Bydlinski and Stoffel propose a twofold solution. First, both would
give legal effect to silence upon receiving a confirmation letter within
the strict limitations of either Article 9(1)128 or Article 9(2) CISG 129.
9 P. SCHLECHTREM, UNrona SALES LAW 57 (1986).
120 Id.
,2, Id. at 57. On the 1964 Formation Convention, see infra text accompanying
note 135; Schlechtriem in D6LLE, supra note 47, at 36; and von Caemmerer, supra
note 39, at 125.
"I As to Art. 9 CISG as a compromise between different approaches to usage of
trade, see ScHLECHTRiEM, supra note 119, at 41; HONNOLD, supra note 105, §§ 114,
118, 121; F. ENDERLEIN, D. MASKOW & M. STARGARDT, KAUFRECHTSKONVENTION
DER UNO (Mr VERJAHRUNGSKONWNTION), KOmMENTAR 54, 55 (1985) (point of view
of the socialist countries); M. Bonell, Die Bedeutung der Handelsbrauche im Wiener
Kaufrechtsubereinkommen von 1980, 103 JBL 385 (1985); Bonell, in M. BIANCA &
M. BONELL COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW. THE 1980 VIENNA
SALES CONVENTION, 103-15, at 105,110 (1987).
123 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 119, at 57 (emphasis added).
,24 Bydlinski, BADEN-SYMPOSIUM, supra note 57, at 80; HERBER, supra note 42, at
18; OTTO, supra note 81, at 141; Stoffel, supra note 82, at 68; Bonell, supra note
122, at 390.
12, Professor of Law, University of Vienna, Austria.
,26 Vice-Directeur de l'Institut Suisse de Droit Compare, Lausanne, Switzerland.
127 Stoffel, supra note 82, at 67, 68; see also Bydlinski, BADEN-SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 57, at 79.
2I Stoffel, supra note 82, at 68.
129 Bydlinski, BADEN-SYMPOSIUM, supra note 57, at 79-80.
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In this respect, they follow Schlechtriem and emphasize that the
particular branch of trade must use confirmation letters and must
accept that silence means acceptance. 30 Moreover, Bydlinski points
out that a confirmation letter followed by silence might be treated
as a modification of an already existing contract. The formation rules
as well as Article 19(2) CISG should govern this modification. Article
19(2) CISG should limit the possibility of modifying the contract
through the confirmation letter, because it allows the reply only to
vary minimally from the offer.' 3' Second, both commentators would
treat the confirmation letter and the subsequent silence under' the
Convention as a declaration serving as evidence of the conclusion
and content of the contract, without precluding, however, the pro-
duction of evidence to the contrary. 32
4. Treatment of the confirmation letter under the 1964
Convention
The 1964 Formation Convention (ULF), like the Vienna Conven-
tion, relied on the principle that a contract is concluded by offer
and acceptance. Article 6(1) ULF defines an acceptance as "a dec-
laration communicated whatsoever to the offeror." This wording
excludes mere silence, in the sense of inactivity, as acceptance. 3
According to Article 2(2) ULF the offeror cannot himself stipulate
that silence means acceptance. Thus, neither the 1980 Convention (in
Article 18(l)(2)) nor the 1964 Convention regard silence as acceptance.
The German delegation to the Hague Conference proposed a third
section to Article 6 ULF stating that silence may be regarded as an
acceptance if such a usage exists. 34 The Conference did not amend
this section because it was felt that the German proposal was covered
by Article 2(2) ULF.'35
The comparison of the provisions of the 1964 and the 1980 Con-
ventions dealing with the usage of trade reveals the broader approach
of the 1964 Convention. Article 2(1) ULF refers to "practice" es-
130 Id.
"I Id. at 81-82. Art 19(2) CISG: "... doles] not materially alter the terms of
the offer. . ."; See also Bonell, supra note 122, at 390.
132 Bydlinski, BADEN-SYMpOSruM, supra note 57, at 81; Stoffel, supra note 82, at
68.
133 But see Art.6 (2) ULF.
134 See von Caemmerer, supra note 39, at 125.
"I HERBER, supra note 42; Art. 2 EAG, 8, 10; Schlechtriem in DOLLE, supra note
47, Art. 6 EAG, 36, 37.
[Vol. 18:427
COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CONFIRMATION
tablished between the parties and to "usage". Article 13(1) ULF
defines usage as what "reasonable persons in the same situation as
the parties usually consider to be applicable", and Article 13(2) ULF
refers to the "trade concerned".
In 1980, a German appellate court was concerned with the intro-
duction of standard terms referred to in a confirmation letter. 3 6 The
court stated that the letter confirming an already-concluded contract
was not covered by Article 6 or Article 7 ULF. It held that the
German domestic concept of silence upon receipt of a confirmation
letter can be regarded as usage of trade, and that the concept thus
supersedes the formation rules of the 1964 Convention as provided
in Article 2(1) ULF. 137
In sum, under the 1964 Convention, the German concept regarding
silence to a confirmation letter as acceptance supersedes as usage of
trade the 1964 Convention's rules. 38
II. CONFIRMATION LETTERS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONVENTION -
THE ANALYSIS
The categories of decisive effect and evidentiary effect from the
German law of commercial letters of confirmation are also a useful
tool in discussing and analyzing the effect to be given letters of
confirmation under the Convention. It should be remembered that
the objective and purpose of the Convention expressed in its Article
7(1) is promotion of uniformity and the observance of good faith in
international law.
1. The Decisive Effect
A. Separate way of forming a contract
Silence after receiving a confirmation letter can have the effect of
forming a contract whereby silence is treated as acceptance and the
confirmation letter is presumed to embody the final contract. This
mode of forming a contract is not directly addressed in the Con-
vention. The crucial question is whether this non-regulation can be
,36Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht in: 1981 RIW/AWD 262 et seq; (with comment
of Kronke, id., 264-66).
'3' Id. at 263.
v on Caemmerer, supra note 39, at 126; Schlechtriem in D6LLE, supra note 47,
at 2, 39; Dilger, supra note 116, at 181; Ebenroth, supra note 6, at 182; OTTO,
supra note 81, at 113.
19881
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
regarded as a gap in the Convention's formation scheme making
domestic law applicable, or whether a solution to bridge the gap is
to be found within the Convention's system.
No provision of the Vienna Convention expressly states that the
system of regulation established in Part II is exclusive. Article 4 only
restricts the regime of the Convention; it does not provide that any
formation has to be ruled by the Convention.
The formation of the contract is regulated in Articles 14-24 CISG.
The contract is formed through offer and acceptance, and Article 23
CISG acknowledges that even in extensive negotiations offer and
acceptance can be identified. Although the Convention addresses only
the traditional concept of contract formation, it sets out this system
of formation in some detail. It contains minimum criteria for an
offer (Article 14), and for withdrawal (Article 15), revocation (Article
16) or termination of an offer (Article 17). Articles 18 to 22 CISG
deal with acceptances. Articles 23 and 24 CISG relate to the time at
which a contract is considered to be concluded. 39
The principal rule on the above question can be found in Article
18(1) CISG which provides that silence does not amount to an ac-
ceptance. Article 19(2) CISG provides an exception to this general
rule for situations in which the parties exchange inconsistent forms
which are not an acceptance in the strict sense of Article 18 CISG. 4'
Article 19(2) is discussed below in more detail. In addition to article
19(2), Article 18(3) CISG governs another form of acceptance. Gen-
erally speaking, Article 18(3) CISG provides for assent by performing
an act rather than by verbally accepting if such a practice between
the parties or usage of trade can be established.' 4'
Part II of the Convention does not cover all forms of concluding
a contract that are theoretically possible or that might be known in
various legal systems.'4 2 However, the scheme in Articles 14-24 is a
sound and closed system which entails rules and exceptions. This
factor can be regarded as a very strong indicator of an exclusive
system which does not allow any interference from domestic con-
cepts. 143
139 HONNOLD, supra note 105, § 132.
140 Id. at § 165.
14- Id. at § 163.
142 SCHIECHTRIEM, supra note 119, at 57.
143 See Stoffel, supra note 82, at 67; SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 119, at 57; Wang,
Das Wiener Obereinkommen uber internationale Warenkaufvertrage vom 11. April
1980, 87 ZVgIRWiss, 184 at 191 (1988).
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Against this interpretation of a comprehensive and exclusive system
in Part II, Huber argues that the domestic concept of decisive effect
could not have been unified by the Convention, and that the concept
is therefore still applicable outside the Convention. Thus, he regards
Part II as not comprehensive ("fragmentarisch").'" This argument
fails to respect the general principle upon which the Convention is
based: the promotion "of unification in its application" (Article 7
(1)) and the "adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts"
(Preamble).
On its face, Huber's argument considers the unifcation purpose.
He concludes that a unification was not reachable, and thus, domestic
law of the silent party should apply. However, unification in inter-
national trade law does not necessarily mean that every national
concept be included in the international Convention. Rather, unifi-
cation means that some domestic legal concepts are not applicable
where the Convention governs the contract. Whether or not the
applicability of domestic law is advantageous for one party is not a
decisive consideration for the promotion of the unification of inter-
national trade law. There might even be a "disharmony" between
domestic law and international uniform law. 45 This is -as Bydlinski
correctly states - the price judges and merchants have to pay for the
benefit of unification. ' 6
In sum, the provisions in Part II of the Convention create
a comprehensive structure and scheme for forming contracts under
the Convention. Any deviating domestic concept such as the decisive
effect of confirmation letters, is superseded by the Convention. A
solution with regard to the effect of confirmation letters can only
be found within the Convention.
B. Decisive Effect in the Framework of the Convention
The result is not necessarily that the decisive effect of the confir-
mation letter is abolished for all transactions. It is only in transactions
governed by the Convention that the legal effect of one party's silence
upon receiving a confirmation letter is necessarily determined by the
Convention.
(i) Article 6 CISG
Article 6 CISG covers a situation which is not very common in
the context of confirmation letters but which should be mentioned.
144 Huber, supra note 43, at 449; Dilger, supra note 116, at 181.
141 Bydlinski, BADEN SYMPOSUM, supra note 57, at 93.
146 Id.
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The parties may agree during their negotiations that a confirmation
letter might be issued, and that the other party's subsequent silence
to the letter shall be treated as an assent. According to Article 6
CISG such an agreement replaces the application of the Convention's
formation provisions. 147 Thus, the confirmation letter has the decisive
effect of concluding or modifying an agreement through the parties'
stipulation. Article 6 does not require an explicit agreement; there
may also be an implied agreement to treat the letter of confirmation
followed by silence as assent. In the case of implied agreement,
however, there should be a clear indication of the parties' intent to
exclude the Convention. 148
(ii) Article 9 CISG
Each of the two sections of Article 9 provides a different framework
for the concept of the confirmation letter. Article 9(1) CISG holds
the parties bound by "any usage to which they have agreed" and
by "any practices which they have established between themselves".
The agreement to apply a particular usage need not be explicit; it
may be implied. The phrase "any usage" indicates that the parties
may agree on a usage that is only a local usage, or on a usage of
another trade. They are not confined to usages respected only in
their particular trade.
The practical importance of Article 9(1) CISG lies in the words
''any practices established between themselves." This phrase can be
explained as a course of dealing adopted by the individual parties. 49
It is necessary that the two parties to the transaction establish the
practice between themselves. 50 The course of dealing may relate to
minor points or may affect the entire contract. The practice in the
sense of Article 9(1) CISG can include the effect of silence to a
confirmation letter as assent to a conclusion or modification of the
contract included in the letter.
A remaining question is when the course of dealing can be regarded
as "established" between the two parties. Section 1 - 205 (1) of the
U.S. Uniform Commercial Code is almost identical to Article 9 (1)
CISG. Section 1-205(1) defines a course of dealing as "a sequence
'4 HONNOLD, supra note 105, § 74.
148 Maskow in ENDERLEIN, supra note 122, at 44. In this respect, Art. 8(1) and
(2) govern the interpretation of a statement, conduct or an implied agreement.
149 Bonell in BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 122, at 106.
150 HONNOLD, supra note 105, §§ 115, 116; Maskow in ENDERLEIN, supra note
122, at 54.
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of previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction
which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis . ... "
More precisely, it has been suggested that the "minimum contact
* . . is established if the controversial transaction is preceded by at
least three other transactions between the parties."'' A German
appellate court, concerned with a Dutch-German transaction held that
standard terms were effectively introduced to the contract by a con-
firmation letter where the seller had been incorporating his standard
terms in regular, frequent transactions between the parties for five
years.5 2 As under Article 6 CISG, the established practice and usage
of the parties under Article 9(1) CISG supersedes the Convention's
provisions. Consequently, such practice or usage can include the
decisive effect of a confirmation letter in forming or modifying a
contract.
Article 9(2) CISG provides a different framework for the confir-
mation letter's decisive effect. Generally, it binds the parties by
"their" usage of trade. More specifically, Article 9(2) presumes an
agreement on usage which
- the parties knew or ought to have known of, and
- is widely known in international trade, and
is observed by the parties in the particular trade concerned.
(emphasis added)
Article 9(2) CISG presumes an intention of the parties to be bound
by a usage if the three criteria set forth in this provision are met.'53
The first criterion, requiring knowledge or constructive knowledge,
is the link between the parties' intentions and the application of a
particular usage; the second requirement of knowledge or observation
of the particular usage in international trade is the objective crite-
rion. 5 4
The very significant language of Article 9(2) CISG indicates that
this Article is more restrictive than Article 13 of the 1964 Formation
Convention or Article 9(2) of the 1964 Sales Convention. 5 5 Unlike
under the 1964 Convention, the concept of the confirmation letter
"I Drobnig, Standard Forms and General Conditions in International Trade: Dutch,
German and Uniform Law, in C. VosKUIm & J.A. WADE, HAGUE ZAGREB ESSAYS
4 ON THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL TR DE 118, 123 (1983).
112 Oberlandesgericht Miinchen 12 August 1977 in 1977 Wertpapiermitteilung (WM)
1361 (incomplete publication also in 1977 IPRspr. no. 20 and 31 NJW 499 (1978)).
"I Bonell, in BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 122, at 108.
154 Id.
133 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 119, at 41.
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is not covered solely because it is known in the country, but rather,
only if the parties involved also knew of the usage or ought to have
known of it. Moreover, Article 9(2) CISG requires that the usage be
widely known and observed in international trade and that it be
known in the particular trade concerned.
An example may serve to summarize the requirements of Article
9(2) CISG. A usage prevails if it is respected in the international
grain trade and followed by parties who buy and sell grain on the
international market. Any usage known in a domestic grain trade is
irrelevant, even if such a usage is so widely known within that country
that the foreign party either knew or should have known of the usage.
It is also irrelevant if the practice is known "internationally" outside
grain-trade circles. 15 6
Thus, the Convention grants domestic usages a very limited effect.
In the context of confirmation letters, such a letter has decisive effect
only if (i) confirmation letters are used in the particular trade con-
cerned; and (ii) the decisive effect is regularly observed by other
parties; and (iii) the two parties to the present transaction knew or
ought to have known of the effect. 57 This interpretation is based
upon a strict construction of Article 9(2) CISG. A strict construction
prevents the unilateral applicability of a domestic usage, such as the
one of the silent party's principal place of business, solely because
it is advantageous for the silent party.'"" More liberal interpretations
would indirectly reintroduce conflict of laws rules and destroy the
uniformity of the law.' 59 Thus, the confirmation letter does not have
decisive effect merely because such effect is a usage known and
respected at the silent party's place of business. ' 60 According to the
wording of Article 9(2), it is crucial that such an effect be recognized
in the particular trade concerned, as well as in international trade.
Huber argues that the German rule of law with respect to the
effect of confirmation letters would be superseded by the Convention.
116 See SCHIECHTRIEM, supra note 119, at 41; Bonell, in BIANCA & BONELL, supra
note 122, at 109.
"I See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 119, at 29; Bydlinski, BADEN-SYmpOSrum, supra
note 57, at 81; OTTo, supra note 81, at 141; HERBER, supra note 42, at 18; Bonell,
supra note 122, at 390.
"I But see Ebenroth, Internationale Vertragsgestaltung im Spannungsverhaltnis
zwischen AGBG, IPR-Gesetz und UN Kaufrecht, 1986 JBL 681, 688.
,19 Compare Drobnig, supra note 151, at 124.
- Rehbinder, Vertagsschluo nach UN Kaufrecht im Vergleich zu AGB und BGB,
in Ew rTLicns KAUFRECHT UND NATIONALES OBLIGATIONENRECHT, FACHTAGUNG
En amrrLicHEs KAUFRECHT AM 16./17.2.1987, 149, 170 (P. Schlechtriem ed. 1987).
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He posits, however, that if a usage of trade in Germany could be
established, this usage could be covered by Article 9.161
Huber's argument, to some extent, may find support in the traveaux
prbparatoires. The United States delegation to the Vienna Conference
reasoned that Article 9 (2) CISG should be extended to the formation
of a contract in cases where silence is treated as acceptance. 62 This
statement, as well as one of the Italian delegation, 163 may lend credence
to the view that the German concept of the confirmation letter should
be treated as a usage of trade under Article 9(2) CISG.
The flaw in this reasoning is its inconsistency with the language
and purpose of Article 9(2) CISG. Compared to Article 6 of the
1964 Sales Convention, the requirement that the respective usage has
to be "widely known to parties in international trade" is an additional
one. The purpose of this requirement is clearly to avoid the application
to transactions with foreign parties of usages which are known and
accepted only in internal trade. 64 The article's wording does not
automatically exclude any usage that is of local origin. 65 The Con-
vention used the term "a usage", or "Handelsbriuche", or "tout
usage", in the broadest possible sense so as to exclude the possibility
that any domestic category or label is relevant under the Convention. 6 6
Article 9(2) CISG defines the requirements which any qualifyig usage
must meet. If these requirements are fulfilled, the particular usage
supersedes the Convention's rules, regardless of whether the label in
domestic law is usage or rule of law. Thus, the discussion on the
source of the concept found in German law is irrelevant under the
Convention's regime.
Any other interpretation of Article 9(2) CISG disregards the sen-
sitive compromise reached in this Article between the different coun-
tries. 167 Developing and socialist countries were particularly concerned
161 See Huber, supra note 43, at 448.
162 A/Conf.97/C.1/SR.6 § 88.
163 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
-" Bonell in BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 122, at 109; Schlechtriem, supra note
119, at 41.
161 HONNOLD, supra note 105, § 121; see also Bonell in BUNCA & BONELL, supra
note 122, at 109.
'6 Bonell in BIANCA & BoNrELL, supra note 122, at 111; Bonell, supra note 122,
at 386.
167 See remark by the Russian Delegation to the Vienna Conference that the final
version represents a compromise on one of the most controversial issues; A/Conf.97/
C.1/SR.7 at 4 § 19 (= O.R. 266 ). See also Maskow in ENDERLEIn, supra note
122, at 55, 56; Bonell in BiANCA & BONELL, supra note 122, at 109.
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that an extensive application of usages would be detrimental to the
weaker party in transactions governed by the Convention. 68 Con-
sequently, any decisive effect of confirmation letters can only be
permitted if the requirements of Articles 9(1) or 9(2) CISG are ful-
filled. Article 9(2), in particular, provides that the confirmation letter
has to be used in the particular trade or business involved; that it
must be generally acknowledged in the trade that silence means assent;
and that the parties knew or ought to have known of this effect.' 69
With respect to the practical application of this solution, at least
in the major legal systems, the party claiming the applicability of
the particular usage must prove both the existence and the content
of the usage. The judge then decides as a question of law under
Article 9(2) CISG whether the usage is applicable to the particular
contract. 70 Thus, confirmation letters still have decisive effect under
the regime of the Convention if the requirements of Article 9(1) or
(2) CISG are fulfilled.
(iii) Article 8 CISG
Article 8 deals with the interpretation of statements of the parties
and with the "conduct of a party" in general,' 7' while Article 18
covers the specific case of silence as inactivity. Article 18(1) expressly
denies any effect as acceptance to a party's mere silence upon receipt
of a confirmation letter. Article 18 is thus applicable as lex specialis,
and Article 8 is not relevant in the present analysis.
(iv.) Article 19(2) CISG
Article 19(2) CISG, as an exception to the general rule of Article
18(1), deals with the situation in which a reply to an offer includes
additional terms and thus cannot be regarded as an acceptance in
the sense of Article 18. Article 19(2) CISG provides that if the terms
added by the offeree are not materially different from those in the
original offer or the offeror does not voice his objections, then the
offeree's response constitutes the acceptance. 72 The content of the
-6 Bonell, supra note 122, at 389; SCHLECHTREM, supra note 119, at 41.
169 SC-LECHTRIEM, supra note 119, at 57; Bydlinski, BADEN-SYM]POSIUM, supra note
57, at 81; OTTO, supra note 81, at 141; HERBER, supra note 42, at 18; Bonell, supra
note 122, at 390.
170 See Bonell in BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 122, at 111.
17 HONNOLD, supra note 105, § 104 (emphasis in original).
172 If the terms are materially different, then the response constitutes a counter-
offer as provided by Article 19 (1) CISG.
[Vol. 18:427
COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CONFIRMATION
contract under Article 19(2) is the one included in the original offer
plus the additional terms contained in the reply. This provision is
clearly a contribution to the method of negotiating and concluding
a contract through prepared pre-printed forms. 73 The Convention
acknowledges the needs of commercial transactions in which an agree-
ment has been negotiated and the shipment of the goods is the parties'
central interest. Thus, the Convention provides in this situation that
a modification is achieved by the act of one party.
The concept offered by Article 19(2) CISG is probably inconsistent
with traditional doctrines in many legal systems, 174 but is very close
to the German concept of the confirmation letter. Thus, Article 19(2)
CISG should be applied by analogy to commercial letters of confir-
mation. This application of a specific provision by analogy is for
civil law lawyers a well-known technique to fill a gap in a code. 75
The Convention, representing a codification of existing law on
international sales, is similar to the commercial codes in the civil law
countries. Article 7(2) CISG is clearly modelled on similar provisions
in the codes of the civil law systems. 76 It provides that any gap
should be filled within the system of the Convention which can be
done either by analogous application of certain provisions or by
applying general principles underlying the uniform system as a whole. 77
Since an analogical application is only permissible if certain require-
ments are fulfilled, the continued uniformity of a statutory scheme
is more likely than in the case where the gap is filled by common
law, which differs from one jurisdiction to the next.
As discussed earlier, neither the Convention itself nor the traveaux
pr ,paratoires expressly provide for the effect to be given a confir-
mation letter under the Convention. In order to fill this gap by
analogous application, it must also be considered "whether the case(s)
expressly regulated by it [the specific provision] and the cases at hand
are so analogous that it would be inherently unjust not to adopt the
same solution for them [the cases] ("argumentum per analo-
,71 HONNOLD, supra note 105, § 165.
,7, Id. § 167; see also Mascow in ENDERLEIN, supra note 122, at 68 with reference
to the parallel provision in the Foreign Trade Law of East Germany in § 31(2) and
31(3) GIW.
"I See e.g. K. LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 358 (4th ed.
1979) et seq.; see for the Vienna Convention Bonell in BIANCA & BONELL, supra
note 122, at 78.
716 Bonell, supra note 122, at 78.
177 Id.
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giam")".178 The cases expressly regulated by Article 19(2) CISG are
indeed very similar to those dealing with the question whether decisive
effect is to be given to a confirmation letter followed by silence. In
both cases, one party issues a letter - a reply or a confirmation letter,
respectively - and the other party will be bound to the terms in this
letter unless he objects to them. Both concepts reflect the commercial
need to simplify and speed up the process of concluding a contract.
Article 7(2) CISG supports this application of Article 19(2) CISG
by analogy to the confirmation letter situation. While good faith
might require that, on the one hand, a material alteration cannot be
introduced unilaterally, good faith would also prescribe that the
recipient party has an obligation to object to a non- material alter-
ation. 17 9 Moreover, Article 29 CISG provides that a contract may be
modified by "mere agreement." These factors suggest that Article
19(2) CISG can be applied by analogy to the confirmation letter. 80
Nonetheless, a major difference between the domestic concepts of
the confirmation letter and the concept resulting from an analogous
application of Article 19(2) CISG must be noted. The decisive effect
of the confirmation letter, as accepted in West Germany and Switz-
erland, can occur in two situations: the letter and the subsequent
silence may conclude a contract, or a concluded contract may be
modified by the letter and subsequent silence. In the former situation,
although the negotiations led almost to a conclusion, no party ex-
pressed a binding intent. By contrast, the situation covered by Article
19(2) CISG is that in which one party had already made an offer
and the other party replied in the way of an acceptance. In this case,
unlike the former situation in which the contract is concluded by the
confirmation letter, both parties have expressed an intent to bind
themselves to the contract. 81
Consequently, the analogy to Article 19(2) CISG cannot be extended
to the former situation, and only the modifying effect of the con-
118 Id. at 79.
179 Kramer in BADEN-SYMPOSIUM, supra note 57, at 95; Herber in id. at 102.
"1 Bonell, supra note 122, at 390-91 n.32; Rehbinder, supra note 160, at 170;
Kramer in BADEN-SYMPOSrUM, supra note 57, at 95; Wey, Der Vertragsschlu3 beim
internationalen Warenkauf nach UNCITRAL und Schweizerischem Recht (Diss Basel
1984), at § § 253, 255.
" Or, as it has been described: "an offer is ... a unilateral authorization to
the offeree to create such a powerful device . . ." as a contract. Sono, Formation
of International Contracts under the Vienna Convention : A Shift above Comparative
Law, in: International Sales of Goods: Dubrovnik Lectures 111-32, at 111 (P. Sarcevic
and P. Volken ed., 1986).
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firmation letter is covered by the analogy with Article 19(2) CISG.
According to Article 19(2) CISG by analogy, the non- objecting
receiver is bound by the terms of the confirmation letter sent after
the contract was concluded.
The situations in which this case can occur, however, are limited
by Article 19(3) CISG, which provides that a contract cannot be
modified materially, and contains a non-exclusive list of material
alterations. 8 2 The catalogue in Article 19(3) CISG seems so compre-
hensive that it is more difficult to think of clauses that are not
covered than those which are.8 3 A clause found very often in con-
firmation letters is the arbitration clause excluding the jurisdiction
of regular courts. This clause, for instance, would fall under "set-
tlement of disputes" and would therefore not have binding effect
when included in a confirmation letter under the Convention.
A document prepared by the International Institute for the Uni-
fication of Private Law in Rome (UNIDROIT)' 4 may demonstrate
the correctness of both the analogous application of Article 19(2)
CISG, generally, and the exclusion of the analogy to confirmation
letters concluding a contract. In its most recent draft on "Principles
for International Commercial Contracts"," 5 UNIDROIT presented,
in addition to its Article 10 which is identical to Article 19(2) CISG,
its Article 11 which contains the following:
If a writing which is sent within a reasonable time after the conclusion
of a contract and which purports to be a confirmation of the contract
contains additional or different terms, such terms will become part
of the contract, unless they materially alter the contract or the
recipient, without undue delay, orally objects to the discrepancy or
dispatches a notice to that effect.
UNIDROIT's Article 11 seems to be drafted precisely in regard to
the doctrine of confirmation letters. The wording of the UNIDROIT
112 HONNOLD, supra note 105, § 169; see for further detail, Farnsworth in BIANCA
& Bo NELL, supra note 122, at 182 et seq.
-8 Farnsworth in BANCA & BONELL, supra note 122, at 180.
194 UNIDROIT Statute of March 15, 1940, at 15 U.S.T. 2494; T.I.A.S. 5743. For
a brief summary of the organization's background, mandate, and membership, see,
United States Department of State, 32d Annual Report, United States Contributions
to International Organizations, Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1983, 100-
101.
1-, UNIDROIT, Study L-Doc. 40 Rev. 2, Principles for international commercial
contracts, (Rome, Jan. 1989); see also UNIDROIT, Governing Council at its 66th
session (Rome, 10 to 12 September 1987): Item 5(b) on the Agenda - Principles for
international commercial contracts, C.D. 66 - Doc. 6, Art. 8.
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provision exactly reflects the proposed concept of this article that the
confirmation letter has only modifying effect; i.e. if it is sent after
the conclusion of the contract. Under both the UNIDROIT provision
and the application of Article 19(2) CISG by analogy, the receiver
of the letter is not bound by it if the letter contains material alterations
or if the receiver objects to it.116 This concept should be applied
within the framework of the Vienna Convention.
This solution probably would have more impact on Austrian and
Swiss law than on German law. The Austrian and probably Swiss
legal systems seem to have abolished the modifying effect of the
confirmation letter. By contrast, the German concept is almost the
same as that in Article 19(2) CISG. For example, if a confirmation
letter which modifies the verbally concluded contract is sent from
Germany to Austria, the solution in German and Austrian domestic
international private law would be that the law of the silent party is
applicable, 87 i.e. Austrian law. Austrian law abolished the decisive
effect of modifying the contract.'88 Thus, the modification would not
become part of the contract. By contrast, under the regime of the
Convention, the confirmation letter may have this effect by analogy
with Article 19(2) CISG unless the modification falls under Article
19(3) CISG.
Under this solution, the aforementioned case of the German ap-
pellate court' 89 would have the following result: If the contract has
not yet been concluded verbally, a conclusion through the mere silence
upon the confirmation letter is not governed by an analogy to Article
19(2) and (3) CISG . Hence, the letter has the decisive effect only
if the requirements of Article 9(1) or 9(2) CISG are fulfilled. Indeed,
in this case, the parties had used confirmation letters in their prior
transactions.
If the contract was already concluded, the introduction of the
standard term is governed by the analogy of Article 19 (2) and (3)
CISG. Therefore it has to be considered whether or not the term is
a material alteration. If it is not, then the standard term is part of
the contract. However, the incorporation does not automatically mean
"' As can be seen from the above analysis, the "and" in the UNIDROIT "unless"-
clause must be a drafting mistake and should rather be "or". [I appreciate receiving
this remark by Professor John Honnold.]
"I Lideritz in SOERGEL & SIEBERT, supra note 117, vor Art.7, 279, 280, 284;
Beckmann supra note 6, at 269, 270; Huber, supra note 43, at 449.
"I See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
189 Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht, supra note 136.
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that the clause is valid. 19° The validity, as Article 4 (a) CISG states,
is governed by applicable domestic law.19'
C. Result
The confirmation letter cannot be regarded as a form of concluding
a contract in addition to the methods in the Convention, because
the entire process of forming the contract with all of its terms is
governed by the Convention.
However, the letter and the subsequent silence may still have de-
cisive effect within the given framework of the Convention. If the
requirements of Article 9(1) or 9(2) CISG are fulfilled, the silent
party is bound by the terms of the letter. In addition, a verbally
concluded contract can be modified by a confirmation letter by
analogy with Article 19(2) CISG unless the other party objects or
the modification is a material one in the sense of Article 19(3) CISG.
2. The evidentiary effect
Confirmation letters have evidentiary effect where they restate the
verbally concluded agreement (situation I). Although the treatment
is not the same in every legal system, the four analyzed legal systems
treat the "evidentiary letter" as evidence of the conclusion and con-
tents of the contract.
Under the Convention's rules, the contract is concluded through
offer and acceptance (Article 23). Whether confirmation letters are
regarded as evidence in the domestic courts is not a matter which
the Convention could regulate since it applies only to the substantive
law of sales and not to procedural questions. The treatment of a
confirmation letter as evidence is a procedural question and is gov-
erned by lex fori192 Thus, the forum state's rules determine whether
or not a confirmation letter will be accepted as evidence, and what
its procedural effect is. 193 In sum, the evidentiary effect is not affected
by the Convention and is governed by lex fori.
190 Kronke, supra note 136, at 265.
191 An interesting question is whether, in case the particular standard term fulfills
the requirements of Art. 9 (1) and (2) CISG the term is valid without consideration
of domestic law: See Kronke, supra note 137 at 266 as to the 1964 Convention. He
concludes from Art 9(2) ULIS that the international usage is the crucial factor. The
usage would have to be proved - according to German procedural rules - by the
sender of the letter.
192 See e.g. R. SCIJTZE, DEUTSCHES INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (1985)
83; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 12.10 (1982).
93 This fact raises a different issue, beyond the scope of this Article, regarding
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IV. RESULT
The four analyzed legal systems grant different effects to silence
upon a commercial letter of confirmation. The effects can be sum-
marized as evidentiary effect, decisive effect of forming a contract,
and decisive effect of modifying a contract.
The Convention's scheme with regard to formation of a contract
is exclusive so that the entire process of forming a contract is governed
by the Convention. Under the regime of the Convention, confirmation
letters and subsequent silence have decisive effect within the strict
limitations of Article 9 CISG. In addition, under Article 19(2) CISG
by analogy, the confirmation letter still has the decisive effect of
modifying a contract. The evidentiary effect of a confirmation letter
is not affected by the Convention but is governed by lex fori of the
domestic court.
the relationship between the Convention as substantive law and domestic evidentiary
rules. The evidentiary effect is an example of such a rule of rebuttable presumption
or prima facie evidence about the correctness of the letter. But there is certainly a
point where such 'prima facie' rules reflecting domestic policies interfere with the
Convention's own policies. Although still procedural rules and, as such, governed
by lex fori, these rules might be regarded as inconsistent with the Convention's
policies, and therefore be rejected.
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